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Discovery of Defendant's Financial 
Condition in Cases Claiming 
Punitive Damages 
I. Introduction 
In recent years the number of cases 
which include a claim for punitive dam-
ages has increased. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland has enlarged the scope of 
cases in which punitive damages may be 
recovered to include those negligence 
cases where there is evidence that the 
defendant was driving while intoxicated 
or where the defendant's negligent con-
duct was wanton or exhibited a reckless 
disregard for human life. I The facts upon 
which the claim for punitive damages is 
based are often hotly disputed. In some 
cases the allegations of fact and the 
claim for punitive damages are not well 
founded, but are asserted primarily to 
improve the plaintiffs bargaining 
position. 
Ordinarily, information concerning a 
defendant'S financial condition is dis-
coverable only after judgment and in aid 
of execution.2 In cases where punitive 
damages are justified, the trier of fact 
may consider evidence of the defen-
dant's financial worth when determin-
ing the amount of such damages. Some 
procedural safeguards are necessary 
when punitive damages are claimed in 
order to balance the access to a defen-
dant's financial· information against pro-
tecting the defendant from harassment. 
Such safeguards are also necessary to 
protect the defendant when the plaintiff 
cannot establish the right to recover 
punitive damages. Safeguards are par-
ticularly important now that the right to 
recover punitive damages in some cases 
is subject to constitutional challenge.3 
This issue does not appear to have 
been litigated recently in any reported 
Maryland decisions. Although it is clear 
that the financial condition of a defen-
dant is relevant in cases where punitive 
damages are alleged, Maryland law pro-
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vides that such evidence is not admissi-
ble until after a defendant is found liable 
and punitive damages are found to be 
warranted.4 Because it is first necessary 
for a plaintiff to prove a prima Jacie case 
for punitive damages before being al-
lowed to introduce evidence of a de-
fendant's financial condition, it is prob-
able that the Maryland courts will follow 
the same protective route in controlling 
the timing of discovery of net worth. 
In Maryland, any matter not privileged 
is discoverable if relevant to the deter-
mination of the case or if reasonably 
calculated to lead to evidence admissi-
ble at trial.5 Evidence of a defendant's 
financial condition, or net worth, is 
admissible at trial when considering 
punitive damages. Therefore, financial 
information falls within the scope of 
relevance where punitive damages are 
legitimately at issue in a case.6 
This does not mean, however, that a 
defendant's financial condition may be 
open to discovery from the onset of the 
case by a mere allegation of the plain-
tiff's entitlement to punitive damages. 
Since the adoption of the new Maryland 
Rules in 1984, there have been no 
reported Maryland cases dealing with 
the issue of exactly when the financial 
condition of a defendant may be dis-
covered. However, the issue has been 
discussed by commentators and courts 
in other jurisdictions, with varying con-
clusions and results. 
The jurisdictions which have ruled on 
this issue and which permit the trier of 
fact to consider the financial condition 
of the defendant in making an award of 
punitive damages fall into three catego-
ries following the three leading cases in 
this area. The first category involves the 
liberal "factual allegation" rule. In Coy v. 
Superior Court,7 a California appellate 
court considered the issue of whether 
pretrial discovery of a defendant's wealth 
was permitted. The trial court ruled that 
the plaintiff must wait until after he 
obtained a judgment in order to dis-
cover such information. In reversing the 
trial court, the appellate court held that 
because the plaintiff sought punitive 
damages, the defendant'S financial in-
formation was relevant and, therefore, 
properly discoverable. The court rea-
soned that because this evidence is 
admissible at trial for the purpose of 
determining the proper amount of puni-
tive damages, the defendant must dis-
close the information in pretrial discov-
ery. Other states which follow this liberal 
rule of discovery include Hawaii8 and 
Tennessee.9 
Since 1981, however, California ap-
pears to have become more conserva-
tive in this area. In 1981, the California 
legislature adopted § 3295( c) of the 
California Civil Code in an apparent 
effort to provide some procedural safe-
guards for this liberal financial discovery 
rule. This law now requires the plaintiff 
to first obtain an order from the court 
authorizing the disclosure. The court 
may, in its discretion, conduct a hearing 
on the matter. Upon a finding that there 
is a substantial probability that the plain-
tiff will prevail on the punitive damages 
claim, an order may be entered permit-
ting discovery of the defendant's finan-
cial status. 10 
The second category of states follows 
a moderate rule which requires more 
than a mere allegation that a plaintiff is 
entitled to punitive damages before an 
order for discovery of the defendant's 
financial condition may be granted. This 
rule was enunciated in a New Jersey 
case, Gierman v. Toman, II where the 
court determined that the financial con-
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dition of a defendant, although relevant 
in a case involving punitive damages, 
deserved some protection. Therefore, 
the court held that a plaintiff's right to 
discover a defendant's net worth was 
conditioned upon prima facie proof 
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover 
punitive damages. This rule is also fol-
lowed in Coloradol2 and Wyoming. 13 
The third approach involves the more 
conservative rule of discovery enunci-
ated by the New York Court of Appeals 
in Rupert v. Sellers. 14 The court reviewed 
and specifically rejected the above two 
rules proposed by the California and 
New Jersey courts, ruling that a plaintiff 
must first obtain a special verdict finding 
him entitled to punitive damages. After 
obtaining this verdict, it is then possible 
for the plaintiff to discover information 
regarding the defendant's financial 
status. 
It is currently unclear which, if any, of 
the above three rules adopted by other 
jurisdictions will be followed by Mary-
land courts. In two cases decided by trial 
courts prior to the enactment of the 
revised Maryland Rules, the courts re-
fused to allow the plaintiffs to obtain 
pretrial discovery from the defendant 
regarding his financial status prior to 
obtaining a judgment. In the first case, 
Whiteley v. Lockner, 15 the court ruled 
on whether a defendant was required to 
answer interrogatories of a plaintiff suing 
to recover money allegedly loaned to 
the defendant. In pretrial interrogatories, 
the plaintiff requested information re-
garding the financial condition of the 
defendant which the defendant refused 
to answer. The court held that these 
interrogatories were premature and 
might be proper if and when the plaintiff 
obtains a judgment. 16 While this case is 
not directly on point, it shows the 
court's tendency to prevent the disclo-
sure of a defendant's financial status 
before the plaintiff proves his entitle-
ment to such information. 
The second case, Miller v. Crook,17 is 
directly on point because the plaintiff 
actually made a claim for punitive dam-
ages. In Miller, the plaintiff attempted to 
obtain information regarding the defen-
dant's financial condition through pre-
trial discovery. The court held that unless 
there is a specific showing of good cause 
why a defendant must disclose his finan-
cial affairs in advance of trial, the issue of 
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defendant's financial condition is con-
sidered severable from the issue of lia-
bility, and pretrial discovery of such 
information is not permitted. However, 
the court ordered the defendant to pre-
pare the information requested and to 
have it available at trial to submit to the 
jury after a determination of the plain-
tiff's entitlement to punitive 
damages. IS 
There does not appear to be any other 
reported decisions regarding this mat-
ter in Maryland. Despite this lack of 
authority, it has been written that Mary-
land courts have traditionally controlled 
the timing of the discovery of net worth 
and required its production only after 
demonstration by the plaintiff of aprima 
facie case for punitive damages. 19 Before 
such a showing, the defendant may 
properly refuse production of net worth 
data. 20 
ff [TJ he outrage . . . is 
that a defendant's 
financial condition, 
while relevant, . . . is 
highly confidential 
and personal. " 
II. Public Policy Considerations 
The major consideration motivating 
the outrage and debate by courts and 
commentators alike is that a defendant's 
financial condition, while relevant to a 
determination of the amount of an award 
for punitive damages, is highly confiden-
tial and personal. The divulging of such 
information, while a great incentive for 
effectuating settlements, may actually 
coerce a defendant to settle unmeritor-
ious claims. This concern was discussed 
in Miller v. Crook21 where the court 
stated the following: 
[indiscriminate discovery] could 
bring about irreparable and unjust 
harm to litigants. A person with an 
unfounded claim could seriously 
embarrass another. A man could 
ruin a business competitor by al-
leging a case for punitive damages, 
discover his opponent's business 
secrets and then dismiss the suit. 
The discovery rules could of them-
selves become an instrument of 
malice.22 
An article discussing the discovery 
and admissibility of a defendant'S finan-
cial condition addressed the public pol-
icy reasons why a rule allowing unfet-
tered, pre-trial access to such financial 
information is injudicious, stating the 
following: 
[T]he vexations aspect of this free-
wheeling discovery is two-fold. 
First, there is a concern that every 
case will be pled as a punitive 
damage case in order to engage in 
pre-judgment asset discovery and 
to apply settlement pressure. 
Second, there is a concern for legit-
imate privacy and proprietary in-
terests which might be unduly 
compromised.23 
If the Maryland courts adopted a rule 
making such discovery immediately avail-
able upon a factual allegation support-
ing punitive damages, defendants would 
be "essentially defenseless against the 
pretrial discovery motions of a plaintiff 
in cases where the alleged conduct 
could support punitive damages."24 
California, one of the first states to 
adopt the "factual allegation" rule, made 
the following observations after two 
decades of that rule's use: 
It soon became obvious . . . that 
such discovery had enhanced 
rather than removed the 'game 
element' by creating a situation in 
which a plaintiff, merely by alleg-
ing a claim for punitive damages, 
could pressure a defendant into a 
settlement because of a desire to 
protect his financial privacy.25 
Another court cautioned: 
If plaintiffs were allowed unlim-
ited discovery of defendants' fi-
nancial resources in cases where 
there is no actual factual basis for 
an award of punitive damages, the 
personal and private financial af-
fairs of defendants would be un-
necessarily exposed and, in some 
cases, the threat of such exposure 
might be used by unscrupulous 
plaintiffs to coerce settlements 
from innocent defendants. 26 
As can be seen from these cases, a 
defendant's right to privacy is held to 
rank higher on a societal hierarchy of 
values than a plaintiff's discovery needs.27 
Therefore, there must be some sort of 
protective measures in place to protect 
such a vital interest. 
Courts in states following the "factual 
allegation" rule have begun relying upon 
protective orders as a means for relief 
for defendants. As a Tennessee court 
noted, "a protective order can be fash-
ioned which protects defendants' legiti-
mate privacy rights while preserving the 
discovery rights of plaintiffs."28 The 
problem with protective orders is that 
they merely prevent public disclosure of 
this private information. Forcing a defen-
dant to disclose personal financial infor-
!!1ation to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs 
attorney may coerce a defendant to set-
tle the case rather than comply with a 
discovery order. 29 
To require the pretrial disclosure 
of a defendant's assets to the plain-
tiff, even as an aid to settlement 
and subject to a protective order 
against disclosure to others, would 
be a serious invasion of privacy. 
The threat of having to place a dol-
lar value on one's assets and to 
disclose that valuation to strangers 
may well serve as a powerful weap-
on to coerce a settlement which is 
not warranted by the facts of the 
case.30 
Other commentators agree that com-
plete "unfettered access" to a defen-
dant's financial net worth by a simple 
allegation of entitlement to punitive 
damages would cause unreasonable ha-
rassment and irreparable harm to a de-
fendant's right to privacy. One author 
argues that the question of discovery of a 
defendant's net worth should not be 
resolved until after the conclusion of 
discovery on the merits.31 After this 
conclusion, the plaintiff must prove a 
prima fade case of a triable issue on the 
defendant's liability for punitive dam-
ages in a "mini-trial" before such dis-
covery is allowed. This technique prop-
erly balances the defendant's interest in 
privacy, the plaintiffs need to discover 
relevant information in time to either 
settle the case or prepare for trial and 
the interest in judicial economy.32 
Another suggestion is that a defen-
dant would be required to file with the 
court a form containing net worth infor-
mation by the date the trial commen-
ces.33 The information would remain 
sealed until the jury rendered a special 
verdict of liability for punitive damages. 
At that time, a recess would be called in 
order to allow the plaintiff the oppor· 
tunity to inspect and challenge the net 
worth representation. The trial could 
then resume with the presentation of 
net worth evidence. 34 
III. Conclusion 
It is premature to conclude that Mary-
land courts will adopt the New York 
rule requiring the plaintiff to first receive 
a special verdict on liability and a finding 
that plaintiff is entitled to punitive dam-
ages before he may discover information 
regarding the defendant's financial sta-
tus. It is clear, however, that there is a 
tendency in Maryland, prior to the en-
actment of section 1O-913( c) of Mary-
land's Courts and Judicial Proceedings 
Article and the current Maryland dis-
covery rules, to protect the defendant 
Ult is more probable 
that the Maryland 
courts will require the 
plaintiff to show a 
prima facie case for 
punitive damages 
before discovery of the 
defendant's financial 
status is permitted." 
from unreasonable intrusion and ha-
rassment by limiting the availability of 
discovery of a defendant'S financial sta-
tus prior to the point where it is shown 
that the plaintiff is entitled to such 
information. 
It is more probable that the Maryland 
courts will require the plaintiff to show 
a prima fade case for punitive damages 
before discovery of the defendant'S finan-
cial status is permitted. As indicated 
above, there are strong public policy 
reasons for a procedure requiring that 
financial information be disclosed only 
after the plaintiff has proved a prima 
fade case at trial or in a separate hear-
ing. These same considerations also sup-
port a procedure which mandates such 
information remain sealed until after the 
trier of fact has determined that punitive 
damages should be awarded or the 
plaintiff has satisfied the court that a 
prima fade case exists. 
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